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VICTOR ZONANA: Let's open it up for comments.
GARY HUFBAUER: What I want to do is somewhat
sharpen the latest disagreement between Jack Mintz and Vito
Tanzi. Jack is from Canada and Canadians are very polite
people, so he was quite polite in his emphasizing the differenc-
es, but I will be less polite. The only problem with Vito's paper
is the title. He used the word "termite." I think he should use
the word with a question mark. Is it termites or worker bees
that work in the system?
When I listened to Vito and Jack, there is a lot of
worker bees going on here because at the end, both of them
said that the corporate tax is probably going to dwindle. I
think that is just great. This is a very useful thing that is
coming out of globalization and also, one sees the erosion of
income taxes as well-especially taxes on capital income, and I
would say another worker bee at play here and all these forces.
The view really depends on how you think both structures
ought to go, and I disagree with my old friend, Stan Ross, on
how revenues and expenditure interact. I think there is some
pressure the other way. I see more cause for celebration than
Vito sees in this and less cause for regret. Having said that,
yes, I would say there are both termites and worker bees, and
there are some termites, and where are they?
The multi-national corporation issue, as I would re-
gard, is pure worker bee and David Bradford talks about this
later. There is a pretty straightforward solution and that is not
a problem. Hedge funds, I think are also not a problem. I
looked at the literature and came up with a much smaller
number, but that is not the question. I think hedge funds, as
tax evaders, are not big tax evaders.
I think the termite issue is one which was in Vito's points
four and six; and that is tax savings which facilitate portfolio
investment of one kind or another and various kinds of finan-
cial transactions so that I think he had a very large number
like $6 or $7 trillion, on which income is slightly taxed. That is
the termite issue in my view. If one could just concentrate on
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that one and actually applaud some of the others, that is how I
would like to see the debate go.
Two other quick points, the IMF really ought to play this
role of defending some of its lesser countries. If you look at the
world today-who is really paying off? The Bay area, Silicon
Valley, all of these areas with a greater conglomeration of
facts. What can some of these poor countries, such as Peru,
Malaysia, and so forth, do? Here we are going to have some
kind of concerted effort to beat up on them in some of these so-
called termite areas. There is a lot of equity at stake and I
think OECD is obviously not going to defend the Malaysias of
this world, or the Egyptians, or what have you. That is where
the IMF comes into place.
Finally, I thought one of Vito's dramatic suggestions was
for the World Tax Organization, because if you take the initials
of that and you think about it, it would take a lot of rhetorical
pressure off the World Trade Organization.
DIANE RING: I was really struck by the termite ending. I
have never thought of myself as part of the' exterminator
group, but apparently we are a little bit in that business. One
of the issues that arises a little bit in this paper and comes up
more in the later sessions is the question or idea of cooperative
efforts and where that might go and some of the questions
related to that.
Obviously, there are varieties and impediments, and we
will be talking about that more, but in connecting that to the
termite image, one of the things that comes to mind-I imag-
ine sort of a building. It has lots of shops, and some of the
shopkeepers would like a new building. Some of them are
happy and there are a lot of termites, so the ones that are
happy with the building aren't focused, but maybe the ones
that are not too happy are eager to see those termites break it
down. There is not enough of a group effort to deal with the
structure and the building collapses; and the termites who
wanted a new one are happy to work toward a new structure
at that point. It may be the new structure is partially a good
idea, but I think one of the points that came up in two of the
papers is that if we allow the termites to work as they go with-
out stopping and aggressively thinking about it, it really is not
going to be the worker bees. It will be the termites, and we
might end up at a final stage that is not the result that those
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hoped for in terms of a new regime. We may be happy to see
the pressure points. We may be happy to see a lot of the pres-
sure points show. If we are not really focused on that, we may
end up with various interim kinds of taxes or revenue direc-
tions that were not what we had in mind.
MICHAEL GRAETZ: One point that Vito is probably not
aware of is the great tax history of termites. They were studied
for years by the IRS in an effort to determine whether they
qualify, whether the termite damage qualifies as a casualty
loss under the Internal Revenue Code and whether it was
sudden and unexpected enough, once the building collapsed, to
be a casualty loss. The IRS ruled that termite damage did not
qualify as sudden and unexpected so, therefore, no casualty
loss was allowed. I disagree with Gary. You stick with the
termite and you get the right tax image.
I want to make three quick points. One is that there is an
important overlap between the real events that Vito is concen-
trating on and the others that have been talked about as well,
and the legal categories that exist. It is important to recognize
that the legal categories were developed in the 1920s and they
have been maintained since the 1920s. Here, it is not just arm-
length pricing which everyone has talked about, but it is per-
manent establishment which about everybody has talked
about. I list some of these in my paper but I will not cover
them in my remarks.
Corporate residence is one that is not mentioned at all in
your paper, which I emphasize. I think this is a fiction that
cannot be sustained in a modern economy for lots of reasons,
which I will not go into now but it is extremely important
because it determines both residence-based taxation and
source-based taxation in many instances. I do not know what
the category of archaic-I call them outdated concepts in my
paper-but the category of archaic legal concepts matching on
to this set of real transactions that you are describing is a
major set of problems that people are talking about all the
time, but they have not really begun to be tackled.
The second point that I want to make is my wariness, my
on-going wariness about the ratio of taxes to GDP as a mea-
surement of the size of government. As a reminder, not only
the targeted tax cuts that Jack mentioned, but the ability to
mandate and privatize, and all sorts of other techniques for
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doing things badly through government may come up. There is
sort of optimism and pessimism going on here. The optimism,
it seems to me, is the imagination of taxes that no one has and
the assumption that they are going to be much better and free
of all the problems. This is my on-going, I think, 25-year prob-
lem with yield exemption consumption taxes which I have
never been able to convince David on, although I think it was
1974 that we first started having this conversation. I never
will convince him, I am sure.
I do think there is a problem of imagining a tax as being a
good tax and forgetting about how Congress, as the worker bee
community, will make it not work the way it has been imag-
ined, and this is just a warning that we may have very bad
taxes. I do think that this idea-you talk about healthcare ex-
penses-if you look at healthcare expenses as a ratio of GDP,
the U.S. is much worse than anybody. Because of the way we
have done it through income tax and payroll tax exemptions or
providing wages in the form of health insurance, we are also
worse on coverage than anyone. On the other hand, we look
good if you look at taxes to GDP ratios in terms of how govern-
ment is doing. I think this is a very big problem in terms of
thinking about the solutions and I want to emphasize Stan's
point that the one thing that governments are really pretty
good at is the pure transfer of cash, which is the Social Securi-
ty system and the retirement security, at least in the social
insurance package that Stan is talking about, we ought to be
wary of giving up the idea of just taxing and transferring if
that is the goal.
VICTOR ZONANA: Do you have a third point?
MICHAEL GRAETZ: That was my third point. I don't
count them the same way everyone else does.
JOHN STEINES: I have a question more than a comment.
We are going to spend a lot of time, I would guess, in the next
day and a half talking about the corporate income tax base.
Jack, you offered the view that you think it is going to dwindle
significantly, and subject with what Mike just said about the
wariness of using tax to GDP figures. Basically what I heard
was that, despite fairly significant drops in corporate tax rates,
corporate tax as a percentage of output has remained stable,
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which would suggest on a very simplistic level that the base is
broadening quite a bit. Some of the termites that have been
talked about are not new. They have been around for a while
and if they have been eating away at the system, I think it is
not just in the last year or two. I wonder why you think the
corporate tax base is going to become so insignificant.
JACK MINTZ: Because of this highly mobile base, which
is a reported profit without having to move physical inputs,
that is where I think the real significant competition or under-
cutting tax breaks are occurring, and it is occurring through
the general rates. Governments have been able to shore up
corporate income tax revenues by base broadening, but if you
start looking at the reforms, and my paper goes into a lot more
detail. If you compare the 1980s and the 1990s experience, the
thing that I am seeing now that is happening across the world.
I am saying this generally as opposed to any one country's
experience, is that in the 1980s, there was a lot of base broad-
. ening in attempts to cut rates and broaden bases and that
would pave the way of keeping up the corporate tax revenues,
and it succeeded.
What is happening in the 1990s now is that there is still
desire to keep cutting rates, and the ability to just broaden tax
bases is not easy anymore because many countries have gotten
rid of a lot of incentives that were existing in the system that
they had before the vested tax cuts and balances and tax hold-
ings. There are still a lot of countries that have the stuff, but I
am just saying that it is harder to broaden the base because
you end up getting some more of the politically powerful parts
of the industrial sector. My favorite example is mining and oil
and gas industry. Here you have an asset that is sitting in the
ground and if anything, is the one you want to tax because it is
not mobile and yet, if you look at tax regimes around the
world, that tends to be where your lowest effective tax rates
are, and the biggest incentives. I know in our experience in
Canada, that is really where you start hitting those powerful
lobby groups in a country. It gets harder to get some of those
things that are there and what countries have been doing is
shifting to other taxes on businesses, away from the corporate
income tax.
That is my point, and we are still seeing falling rates
around the world. I think that is going to continue and I think
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the idea of having 10, 15 percent corporate income tax rates
within 10 years, I don't think it is going to be that unusual,
and Hong Kong is not going to equate the tax haven anymore.
I do not think it even looks like a tax haven anymore. As a
result, I am saying in 20 years, I think this extreme form of
competition is going to occur. People are going to say, maybe
we have to move the system away from the corporate income
tax entirely and do something else.
VICTOR ZONANA: I have on the list Phil West, Victor
Thuronyi, Dan Shaviro, and then Hugh Ault.
PHIL WEST: I want to make a series of brief points, some
more narrow, some more broader. First of all, on the taxes of
percentage of GDP, I do not think anyone mentioned what I
find to be a relevant statistic, which is in the U.S. we are at
the low end of all OECD countries and the amount of revenue
we collect is a percentage of GDP, whether it is relevant as an
absolute matter. I do not know, but relatively speaking, I find
that relevant.
I think it is necessary, since Vito mentioned that I have
another idea for a termite, that I say what it is. It is what I
see to be the increasing use of what I call across border arbi-
tration and it is a function of a number of things: increased fi-
nancial engineering, increased tax planning... and it is facili-
tated by a couple of the termites that were identified by Vito.
Tax havens and lack of coordination among countries, because
the more there are discontinuities and disparities among sys-
tems, the easier it is to arbitrate systems.
A point of clarification-both Hugh and I kind of winced in
our seats when Vito started talking about tax havens that, say,
why should we have to impose income taxes? Just for the re-
cord, no jurisdiction needs to impose an income tax to get off
the list of tax havens. That is an important point. You can still
have zero taxes, no income taxes, and not be classified as a tax
haven. It is not a necessary prdrequisite.
I want to support Stan's point on what drives. I am not a
budget expert, but it seems to me in my experience that the
expenditure side is what is going to drive the revenue side
more than vice-versa. A related point is whether we should be
in the business of shaping or calibrating the size of our govern-
ment based on what we are no longer able to raise in revenue.
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Should we let this happen through the back door. In other
words, the fact that we are losing our ability to tax capital
income... should that be what drives our decisions about the
size of our government? Or should we be making conscious
decisions about the size of our government in raising the nec-
essary revenue to fund that? I think Diane made a point relat-
ed to this. Do you want to let the building fall down just to
rebuild it or not? I am reminded of Ralph Nader's strate-
gy-let's gut the system. Let's see how conservative we can get
and then we can move the liberals into power that way.
Two final points, it seems to me that low rates in a broad
base can be consistent with international coordination. I am
not sure if Jack intended his list of what governments can do
to be mutually exclusive, but it seems to me that international
coordination is not necessarily a bad thing because it can lead
to-whatever your perspective whether it would be Gary's or
another-lower rates and a broader base. In fact, when I was
in the government, that is what we liked to think we were
trying to do with the OECD project.
The final point is Stan's point about the importance of
employment taxes. We can sit here and talk about the desire
and ability of capital taxes, or the extent to which we are going
to lose our ability to tax capital, but it seems to me as a politi-
cal matter if we do lose our ability to tax capital and the base
does shift to labor, I think that it is going to be unattainable
as a political matter. I think we ought to keep that in mind
and there is a fairness issue there in addition to a political
issue and those are related and Michael's paper goes into the
importance of the fairness issues. Not only is it unattainable,
but I think it is undesirable also.
VICTOR THURONYI: I cannot resist the termite meta-
phor and I think it is a good one. Part of what I wanted to talk
about was the extermination part-that it is a characteristic of
termites that to exterminate, it does not make a lot of sense to
start going after individual termites. Of course, the tendency of
administrators or legislators is to try to enact specific rules to
attack individual problems. I think this metaphor shows us
that these rules will tend not to work and what we need is to
work on underlying principles, which we are going to talk
about later today and tomorrow; and on process, which I will
talk about tomorrow afternoon, and which Mr. Tanzi has
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talked about in terms of some kind of international organiza-
tion or forum for dealing with problems.
On the process issue, it is both a matter of trying to get
this structure right and continuing review. That is another
aspect of termites: you have to keep inspecting and taking
stock of the situation. That is, I think, the appropriateness of
the termites.
DAN SHAVIRO: I think we want to be more careful of
what we mean, or what happens when there is no corporate
income tax. Suppose the corporate income tax is going to disap-
pear, we have to figure out exactly what that means, what is
really happening. Why don't we like the corporate income tax?
I would say the two reasons why we don't like the corporate
income tax would be that it is an income tax-so it is a de-
ferred consumption-and the other reason might be that the
classical test is that they were double-taxing. We are obviously
penalizing corporate investment in many settings because you
tax it once and, with the distribution to the shareholders, you
tax it again.
It is not clear to what extent those are the problems that
are addressed if "the corporate income tax" is wiped out. If you
have good advice and there is only one level of tax, and for
that matter if you have consumption tax accounting and
expensing in the like, then it starts to look very different. You
can essentially be a proxy tax on the owners.
The two things that we might not like about the corporate
income tax, again, is that it is an income tax. I have not had
time to work through this. It struck me that some of the prob-
lems that Vito and Jack discuss are possibly particular to in-
come taxation or the current technology of income tax collec-
tion. Others might be more general. Obviously, things like the
tourism problem or the problem of the unobserved Vito was
talking about, the creation of joint barter clubs if you have e-
cash, and that sort of thing. Obviously that is going to be a
problem for either system if it emerges a serious one.
Suppose we had consumption tax accounting, expensing or
the like, it is useful to track through which of these problems
disappear and which of them do not. Most of them do not have,
necessarily, the timing conventions of income tax so much as
the technologies of how it is set up and when the tax is collect-
ed and so forth.
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The second thing, I think it is quite easy to agree it is sort
of silly to have a classical corporate tax where you tax at the
corporate level and at the shareholder level. The tax at the
shareholder level is something that is often avoided to a fair
extent and in some cases what is happening is that the corpo-
rate tax is the tax you get, and you risk having the corporation
be a tax shelter where there is never any distribution. If you
could observe the distributions and tax them, you would in
effect have a cash flow consumption tax. If you could observe
all the distributions, do you take the money out of the corpora-
tion that is in effect, like spending it out of your qualified ac-
count? That is not necessarily what we are talking about here.
It is very possible, to some extent, that the corporate taxes we
have around the world are, in effect, proxy taxes on the owners
where you are not going to really get the second level and if
you cannot tax those things, then what you basically have is a
tax on being unable to earn your income through a corporation
for tax purposes. Like in the United States, of course, it is
well-known from an allotted tax law, a basketball player can-
not say, I am now a corporation that is hiring myself out to the
Knicks and if the U.S. could disregard the corporate elements.
To some extent, if you have the corporate tax disappearing,
what it could mean is that we are taxing being an employee,
not being able to do the same things, but have your different
incentive structure and legal relationships where you are not
called an employee. That would not be a very desirable state of
affairs. We do have to think about exactly what it means for
the corporate income tax, who is really paying tax, what are
the conditions and what you can avoid, and the like.
I agree with Gary about the undesirable features of the
current system that are being whittled away. We have to think
about what is actually being whittled away relates to those
bad features rather than something else.
A final brief point on capital versus labor. I think David
and others have done good work. It is not necessarily a good
way of thinking, to think of the tax on Mlicrosoft as the tax on
capital and the tax on me is the tax on labor. We are not talk-
ing about yield exempt. We are talking, for example, consump-
tion tax accounting and the like. Bill Gates, in effect, pays a lot
of tax, or Microsoft does, because they earned marginal re-
turns. There is certainly a political problem of being perceived
as capital versus labor. Whether we tax the return to waiting
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and so forth is probably a better way to think of things rather
than capital versus labor as these categories. The people who
make money through a corporation are paying the corporate
income tax. It is sort of labor in a way, especially for the fact
that they only use income tax appreciation.
HUGH AULT: I think it is inevitable that, given the inter-
connected nature of all of these issues that we would sort of
get them all out on the table at the same time and if we talk
about all of them this morning, we would not have anything to
do this afternoon or tomorrow. I will not talk about interna-
tional cooperation or the mechanisms for international coopera-
tion that we might think about. I would also like to resist the
termite metaphor or any other metaphor. Metaphors some-
times can be helpful, but also sometimes they can be more
confusing than clarifying.
I would like to put on the table what seems to me the
conversation we have been having. It seems to me that there
are people who think that the income tax is the appropriate
way to approach the funding of governmental expenditures.
Some people do not believe it. It seems to me it is one exercise
to do a mind experiment. It will be more difficult for some
people than others, but do a mind experiment: that you wanted
to have a good functioning income tax and you went through
Vito's paper and you identified the number of problems which
seemed to jeopardize getting to that policy goal. Then you
would have to think at each problem; transfer pricing is diffi-
cult. It has gotten better. We have the guidelines. We have the
procedure developments of APA on the one end of the proce-
dure and possibly arbitration on the other end of the proce-
dures as some of those difficulties are being modified. Then we
could think about whether some sort of formula approach
might be a better fix to that problem. We could say that capital
flight into tax savings is a problem and, therefore, maybe there
should be some sort of effort to try to convince the tax havens
that it would be in all of our interests that we cooperate or
something like that, which is more or less what we are doing.
Unfortunately, the argumentation, which was very much
Gary's argumentation, that comes out in a lot of the publica-
tions, is we do not want an income tax; we have a different
goal and therefore, we either applaud or object to efforts taken
to deal with problems in the income tax. Gary draws the line
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at tax evasion and tax havens that undercut the income tax.
There are obviously other people out there, if you have read
any of the literature that has been coming out on this, that do
not take that position.
I think it is very important to distinguish the framework
of the conversation. Are we talking about an income tax? Do
we want to keep an income tax, or are we talking about a
consumption tax and what a consumption tax may look like?
DAVID BRADFORD: A couple of points, I think there is
less of a difference between proper income taxes and consump-
tion taxes than most of this community seems to believe. I do
not think it is that big of a difference.
I also want to mention to* Hugh that Alan and I are back,
and I think we have designed the right way to do a real in-
come tax. We really worked at it. I do not think you will like
it, but we think we have designed the only way to do it. I was
not quite sure how relevant this was. The discussion of the size
of the government is an interesting one, and another kick of
mine has been that we do not have very good ways of describ-
ing governments and saying what we are doing. That I call it
our budgetary languages is poor.
One of my favorite examples that I use to illustrate this is
the debate that arose at the beginning of the first Clinton term
when he came in. He had a big deal about how he was going to
attack the budget deficit problem. He was going to have one
part tax increase and one part a spending cut. It turned out to
be very hard to do, of course, but the package that he finally
came up with involved increasing the taxation of Social Securi-
ty retirement benefits and we enacted it. The question was
whether that extra revenue was a result of a spending cut or a
tax increase. The administration wanted to say it was a spend-
ing cut because they had to get more spending cuts because of
its promise they made to match spending cuts and tax increas-
es. Of course, the opponents, the Republicans, said that that is
a tax increase. An economist thinking about it would say it
doesn't make the slightest bit of difference what you label it.
The real impact is the same. It makes no difference whatsoev-
er, but, of course, politically it does seem to. The fuss died
down when it turned out that Reagan had done exactly the
same thing and called it a spending cut in one of his budgets,
so they stopped fussing about it. The Republicans stopped
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attacking Clinton on the point.
I think there is a major lesson in it, which is you really
cannot tell from these labels what something is, whether it is
spending or taxation. If you were to ask "what is the ratio of
taxes to anything," you would have to answer that question
and it is clear there is no meaningful way to do that. There are
real economic effects going on here that you can describe, but
our language is very poor at it.
I think another interesting example of that which is rele-
vant, again not to substance but psychologically thinking about
these things, is the discussion of employment tax that Stan
had. I understand what he means and am not saying that it's
wrong, but most people would say that a value-added tax,
particularly value-added tax of the consumption type, is equiv-
alent to a wage tax and earnings tax.
All of those countries where you-gave me the total for their
employment tax, I bet you did not put the value-added tax.
From a functional point of view they are the same and, for
some, certainly thinking about the economic impact of those
things. You would want to put those things together. We are
being quite badly misled by the language in that regard.
One last thing: right now many of us, because of the tax
incentives, would like to put more away into our retirement
plans, than we are allowed to. If we were to re-label those con-
tributions to our retirement system as taxes, we would not
change the economic thing at all, but we would radically
change the description of what our governments are doing. We
have this very heavy employment tax, whereas functionally,
what that particular system is doing is the opposite of what
you think employment tax would do. You think it discourages
work, etc., whereas that particular part of our system encour-
ages work, so you can raise the amount you are allowed to put
aside into these systems.
Again, many of these European systems, and it's true to
an extent in our own Social Security system, those payroll
taxes really are just functional in terms of an employee's life
cycle, just like contributions to retirement plans and the set of
incentives that are created by those things are very different
from the set of incentives we would think about if you were
using a payroll tax to pay for national defense. It is a totally
different set of incentives you get as a result because of the life
cycle phenomenon of the so-called "spending," which is really
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negative tax and benefits in the old age in that case are going
to exactly offset the impact of the things that are called taxes
in the earlier part of the life cycle.
PETER MERRIL: What was striking, I think, from Vito's
talk, is those two things from a tax administration standpoint
that are viewed as really big problems and it is a little odd and
discordant because from an economic perspective, we think of
technological development and competition as the really won-
derful things. I had the sense that we are being a little bit too
gloomy. Maybe this termite destruction is really part of what
Chuck called creative destruction; that perhaps competition in
technological change, while they are obviously having major
beneficial impacts on the private economy and are responsible
for the productivity growth that has generated huge budget
surpluses that we have, that they also may be opportunities for
tax administration. The technology area is certainly the higher
productivity that can be gained from the use of information
technology and should be able to free up folks that are current-
ly spending their time doing very menial tasks in tax adminis-
tration to doing much higher work and auditing the larger tax-
payers. It strikes me that there must be opportunity for enor-
mous productivity enhancement in government administration.
I think the technology change is leading to a fair amount of
concentration. I think 80 percent of e-commerce was done by
50 companies which, in some ways, should make the job easier
for tax auditors if there is a huge concentration in the activity.
I think the opposite is happening from what many people
thought could happen with technology.
In the competition area, it certainly seems to me, from an
economist's view, that the tax competition has many good as-
pects to it. Also, I think the OECD tax competition project
recognizes there is a taboo aspect that the economists talk
about the tax competition of greater matching of the benefits
provided by government with tax revenues, and the competi-
tion keeps those things in line. I definitely think there is a
distinction between the good tax competition-which is the
process of making sure the benefits and revenues are in line
with each other, and responses to what we believe-and bad
competition, which I would view as a haven for tax evasion:
basically not cooperating in exchange of information and essen-
tially abetting tax evasion from developed countries.
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I think it is a very different kind of competition and really
should be distinguished. I think there is actually a positive
side to the technology and competition in the fiscal area, not
just the termites and negative aspect of it.
VICTOR ZONANA: Any more comments? I want to give
both Vito and Jack a chance to reply.
MICHAEL GRAETZ: There has been a lot of talk about
the corporate taxes not declining. The other fact, which has not
been mentioned, is that we assume that we are not taxing
income from capital. If you look at the statistics of income data
over the last year in which income was reported-which I
think is 97 returns-there was $425 billion of capital income
reported on individual returns. We are managing tax, a lot of
capital income and individuals as well. If you think the size of
the government is not going to shrink commensurate with the
disappearance of these taxes, then you are going to have to
have higher taxes on something else. The question is, what are
the rates? As you lose instruments of taxation, you lose the
ability to have low rates on multiple instruments. I think that
is an important point that seems to me to have gotten over-
looked in this conversation so far.
I also want to say that I agree with David's last comments,
because it is so rare for us to have that opportunity.
DIANE RING: I wanted to add something to what Hugh
said, which is to the extent that part of the reason for the lack
of underlying support for action against the termites is, in fact,
a disagreement about the sustenance direction we should be
taking with the income tax that really is part of what is going
on. What we may be saying is if you do not like the income
tax, go at it directly, but do not wait for it to collapse before
you really enter the area in a constructive way. One add-on to
that is to the extent that you see the environment-and that
partially comes out of this morning's papers-the environment
is a changing one in terms of the realities for the tax system.
It may be that the very difficulties that we are seeing will, in
fact, shape our views about what is the proper tax system.
David would be very happy about that, but I think they are
both connected and quite separate, and we need to be clear
about, as Hugh said, whether we are talking about trying to
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figure out how to improve an income tax if you do not want to
do it anymore, maybe because of the very problems we see, and
then you need to be very explicit about that in going forward.
GARY HUFBAUER: A brief comment on what Dan
Shaviro and Michael Graetz said. If one is as skeptical as I am
about the corporate income tax, that should never be equated
to being skeptical about taxes on capital. There are a lot of
ways you can tax capital that you do with the corporate income
tax and the emphasis I would put on taxing at the personal
level, all these wonderful receipts which are floating around in
either.
VICTOR ZONANA: Any other comments from the audi-
ence or panelists? We are going to give the floor to Jack and
then to Vito and then we will have a couple of closing com-
ments and adjourn for lunch.
JACK MINTZ: I am not going to try to respond to all the
comments that were made, but I would like to take three of
them that I think are quite relevant to the discussion.
The first point really goes to the comment that Stan had,
and others, about whether more mobile tax bases and global-
ization makes some taxes more difficult might have implica-
tions to the size of government. The reason I made my com-
ments is first of all, when you think of the size of government,
whether it is through political economy process or just thinking
in terms of efficiency, the size of government is going to be
dictated by the marginal benefits that one gets from additional
government expenditure and whether that is sufficient in
terms of the cost of raising revenue to finances and expendi-
tures.
My main point really is nothing different than what they
are seeing in terms of implication. What I am trying to imply
is, as a result of globalization, there are going to be some taxes
that are going to be harder to raise. And because the marginal
cost of raising those taxes-the economic cost of raising those
taxes-are going to go up a lot or significantly, then govern-
ments, in order to raise just the same revenue, will have to
rely on other taxes. But then they start raising rates, and
this goes to Michael Graetz's comment at the end: that when
they start raising rates, of course the marginal cost of raising
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those taxes are going to go up. So the total cost of raising taxa-
tion or tax revenues will rise as a result of having the inability
to, or the difficulty of, imposing some taxes on certain bases.
So I would argue that, yes, we will go to more employment-
based, employment taxes. In Canada and the United States
there's probably room to move in that direction. But I think it's
also important to distinguish between two types of taxes in
that regard-one of them being a general payroll tax that some
countries have had. In fact, my own has some of the provinces
and Canada have that already. Then another type is a user
pay-related tax, payroll tax, which is a payment for certain
benefits. My argument is that we will see more of these user
pay-related taxes, including employment benefit taxes. But
again, there's only so far you can go.
I was just in Belgium, and they were talking about some
of the reforms that they're undertaking. They have no fiscal
surpluses, and they're cutting taxes. Where are they cutting it
first? They're actually cutting it as employment taxes because
there is a real resistance now to having such high taxes on
labor income in Belgium. They have very high personal income
tax rates, and they also have very high payroll taxes; and that
is a very significant issue. So when you start looking at some
of the other countries, there's only so far you can go on certain
taxes.
The second point I wanted to make goes to Phil West's
comment about my strategies: are they going to be mutually
exclusive? I think my comment would be that from a political
economy point of view, I think we're going to see all of them
being done. We're going to see some protectionism in certain
countries. There may be edges that one will see. I think we
will see changes in tax structures as a result of the changes
that are going on worldwide.
I think we will see some constraints on how, especially in.
the countries with very large government sectors that I think
that you'll see some reduction in that. By the way, we can go
into the issue about budgeting and tax and incentive versus
expenditures and things like that. To me that's not relevant.
To me it's just the overall intervention of the size of govern-
ment. Often, when you're talking about governments that are
50 percent of the economy, they're large; and they're doing a
lot of regulation. And they're doing lots of tax incentives be-
cause.., that's what happens. They end up actually talking to
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countries with very high taxes that use tax incentives a lot,
because it takes the burdens away from the things on which
the fiscal burden might be a real problem.
So these I would suggest are pretty complimentary. So I
think the size of government relative to the size of the econo-
my is a pretty good indicator about how much intervention
governments have in the economy. But I think all those strate-
gies are going to be done and including cooperation at the
international level. That gets to my political economy thing.
Even though I personally like the idea of moving towards
consumption taxes, I think that's a hard thing for governments
to swallow. I think the idea of taking taxes off the rich is going
to be politically a difficult thing to sell in their countries. We
also know that wealth taxes are not simple to put on. I mean
you end up exempting the farmers and the small businessmen,
and everybody else. So you know that politically, people are
going to be looking for ways to tax the rich no matter what
happens. Governments will try to shore up the income tax in
some way, and they'll be looking at cooperatives efforts at the
corporate level. If they don't cooperate, and if they fail over the
next number of years, then I think they're going to end up
looking at other taxes on the rich.
The same thing with businesses. The corporate income tax
in my view will fall, and will continually decline relative to
other taxes on businesses. But I really think that the political
economy is that people will want to maintain taxes on business
in some form. If it isn't the corporate income tax, it will be
something else; and that's what's been happening... I know
that's been happening in Canada. I wish we could have a real
detailed historical study of many countries on the relationship
between profit and profit insensitive taxes to see whether there
has been this shift of profit insensitive taxes over time.
The only series I've seen, or at least for one year, was in
Vito's book. But I think we need a careful historical study that
would be done. So that's a good project for the OECD to do.
VICTOR ZONANA: You have your marching orders Hugh.
Vito, you have the near to last word.
VITO TANZI: Thank you very much. I will take three, four
points that were made by several speakers. But the first one,
the fiscal termite maybe... I tried but not to give a conno-
2001] 1329
BROOK. J. INTL L.
tation. I tried to be neutral about. I thought I was simply de-
scribing what would happen if we allow the process to go for-
ward. Now whether they're fiscal termite when you would
change to worker bees, then you begin to bring value judgment
into that. The assumption here is that it well may be time to
get rid of all the bad taxes. You know, the termite will do its
work and then will produce very nice taxes.
This reminds me a little bit of a discussion that took place
about maybe 30 years ago during inflation. When, inflation
was distorted; distorting income taxes and especially the in-
come from capital; and there was a big discussion which was
very similar to the one today. I remember Professor Felner. I
don't know, many of you may not know him. Economists would
know who he is. He was a very prominent economist that died
ten years ago. Making the analogy, he said "when I hear this
discussion, I find myself in the situation of a plastic surgeon
that has been called to a hospital, or somebody in a horrible
accident, the whole face was disfigured; and now he's given a
picture of this guy and he has to work on this. It's obvious that
this guy is very ugly. Now what do I do? I restore the way it
was or do I improve the look?" Well this essentially is the dis-
cussion we are having here.
And there is some sort of implication that somehow if we
get rid of it, bad taxes, corporate taxes ... this is a marvelous
idea of David's, and others will come in. This is now what will
happen. I mean the reality that you will have what Europe
and the OECD call "tax degradation." You will have bad taxes
coming forward. I mentioned that what is happening like in
America with the financial transaction taxes, that's more likely
to happen. So maybe we should be guarded about cheering this
process. This was the first point.
The second point: there's been a little bit of discussion
with the taxes driving government spending or government
spending drives taxes and how high should the government
spending be. Also, the question that whether the taxes to GNP
ratio is a good measure of the size of government. I wrote a
paper recently called "Globalization: The Future of Social Pro-
tection," in which I argue that the role of government works
through two different channels mainly. One is spending and
tax expenditure, and the other one is regulation. Many regula-
tions are really substitutes for taxing and spending. All the
European countries-Sweden and so forth-are famous
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because they have very high taxes. But there are most on tax
expenditure, and they don't have an economic regulation. I
mean really the regulation that took place is tax and spending.
They have a regulation for social and various other things. So,
in some way, their tax to GNP ratio distorts the size of the
government compared to the US.
Well there were some many other very interesting points.
Stan made several points about combining the tax adminis-
tration and the collection agencies for social security. Of
course, as you know, this works in some countries and doesn't
in other countries. The fact that administration is very bad,
and you add to them the task of collecting social security taxes,
maybe it will make them a little bit worse. So you have to al-
ways take with a grain of salt.
On the corporate income tax, one interesting question is
what do we do about this tax? I remember there was a German
economist who worked in the U.S. in the 1950s. Garrett Kolb
wrote a book on the corporate income tax in which he talked
about the cynical law of taxation. He said that government
essentially will collect the taxes which are easiest to collect. He
saw no justification for having a corporate income tax, but he
assumed that this income tax will continue.
My preference for the corporate income tax has always
been a Milton Friedman idea. Now that's... I don't know
whether there's been much discussion of it. That essentially we
should have no tax on corporations, but all the profits of the
corporation should be distributed forcefully every year to the
shareholders. And you tax the shareholder, period. Thank you.
VICTOR ZONANA: Wonderful ideas coming out here.
Stan?
STANFORD ROSS: Yes, I want to pick up on one of David
Bradford's points and maybe ... it's the difference in perspec-
tive between economist and lawyer. The language isn't very
good, but the language has consequence and drives people. I'll
use your same example to show that.
When income taxation was first imposed on social security
retirement benefits, to get it through they had to provide the
debt which ought to be general revenues, obviously, gets recy-
cled back into the trust funds to pay benefits; and so, in a way,
it's going to go out as an expenditure at some time. This is
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what it took.
Then when the Clinton Reform went in, Medicare Trust
Fund was having a terrible problem. So the logic of the recy-
cling so there will be, you know, we know we're doing a bad
thing imposing income taxation on retirement benefits that,
you know, people didn't expect. We'll put it in the Medicare
Trust Fund cause it needs the money. So now it's being used to
pay health benefits.
When the recent proposals came from the Republicans
that they wanted to reverse this as a campaign thing, the
Democrats accused them of trying to undermine Medicare.
They're taking money out of the Medicare Trust Fund, which
ought to be a lockbox. So here is the shell game-general reve-
nues to the OASDI Trust Fund, to the Medicare Trust Fund,
and you try to explain this to anybody on The Hill, you know,
they don't get it, which gets to Vito's point which is this lan-
guage that is used does have consequences.
I guarantee you, social security taxes are good and value
added taxes are bad in most people's minds, even if there is
some equivalent. The degradation factor is very important
because of the short-term nature of what people will do. If they
get in a hole like they were with Medicare in the 1980s, they'll
just go find that money anywhere they can because of the
pressures of needing to continue to pay those benefits. That's
one thing Vito and I were talking about at a sidebar earlier,
which I think I'll just end with; and that is that governments
get extremely short-sighted when they're under pressures, and
they usually make very bad policy judgments because they do
follow the line of least resistance.
By the way just to show you I've got a memory, I recall
when we taught Tax I, there was once an argument that when
termites ate fast enough, it was a casualty, and you could get a
deduction. It was a question of how fast they ate.
VICTOR ZONANA: That silly case is in the Eighth Circuit.
Well thank you. This has been a very good session. I think
we've had some wonderful talks identifying for us some of the
problems that we're facing going forward. Through the discus-
sion what has also emerged is that we're asking a number of
important questions that have been asked over and over hav-
ing to do with what are we going to do with the income tax?
Do we want an income tax or something different? What
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should we do about the corporate income tax? Some people
would like to get rid of it. Others think otherwise.
We basically accomplished exactly what I hoped we would
in this session: to lay the groundwork for the next three ses-
sions in terms of talking about what are we going to do on the
international tax side with a few of the papers, assuming that
we have an income tax, and then others moving into David's
[Bradford] world of something somewhat different.
The one thing that has not emerged in this discussion so
far, and that I hope will as we go forward because we have
kept this at a fairly general and theoretical level, is what is
going on out there in the real world? Mike [Graetz] made some
allusions to it, but you have to think in terms of what it is that
the tax practitioners are doing, and how are they applying all
of these wonderful rules? What do they mean to them? We
have focused the government concerns. I think in the continu-
ing discussions we'll focus on what is happening to the taxpay-
ers and how they're advised, what these rules are doing in
terms of the kind of advice that they're getting, and the prod-
ucts they're getting into.
With that, I think we will close this session, thank our
panelists, and thank everybody.
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